Does A Loss of Social Credibility Impact Robot Safety? by Menon, Catherine & Holthaus, Patrick
Does a Loss of Social Credibility Impact Robot Safety?
Balancing Social and Safety Behaviours of Assistive Robots
Catherine Menon
Adaptive Systems Research Group
School of Computer Science
University of Hertfordshire
Hatfield AL10 9AB, United Kingdom
Email: c.menon@herts.ac.uk
Patrick Holthaus
Adaptive Systems Research Group
School of Computer Science
University of Hertfordshire
Hatfield AL10 9AB, United Kingdom
Email: p.holthaus@herts.ac.uk
Abstract—This position paper discusses the safety-related func-
tions performed by assistive robots and explores the relationship
between trust and effective safety risk mitigation. We identify
a measure of the robot’s social effectiveness, termed social
credibility, and present a discussion of how social credibility may
be gained and lost. This paper’s contribution is the identification
of a link between social credibility and safety-related performance.
Accordingly, we draw on analyses of existing systems to demon-
strate how an assistive robot’s safety-critical functionality can be
impaired by a loss of social credibility. In addition, we present
a discussion of some of the consequences of prioritising either
safety-related functionality or social engagement. We propose
the identification of a mixed-criticality scheduling algorithm in
order to maximise both safety-related performance and social
engagement.
Keywords–Human-Robot interaction; Social credibility; Robot
safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
Assistive robots offer significant benefits to an increasingly
elderly population, both in terms of their social impact and
their functionality [1][2]. Assistive robots support independent
living by aiding humans to conduct basic activities, such as
preparing food and bathing. Similarly, these robots may support
the psychological health of elderly or isolated individuals via
socially-important behaviours, providing companionship and
encouraging these individuals to engage and interact.
There are safety implications to the use of assistive robots,
both in terms of the physical hazards they present and in
terms of the functionality they provide. An assistive robot will
often act as mitigation for a safety risk, alerting the user to a
hazardous situation and requesting that they take action.
In this paper we bring together concerns from the safety
community and the robotics community. The social effects
of autonomous systems are not typically factored into hazard
analysis of these systems, and this paper aims to address that
omission. Equally, from an Human-Robot Interaction (HRI)
perspective the ways in which the social performance of an
assistive robot are affected by safety features (e.g., automatic
stops, avoidance of physical contact) is not always explicitly
considered. Bringing these concerns together within a single
domain provides the research community with a foundation for
discussing how to assure the safety of an autonomous system
which must also perform another (social) function. This is
Figure 1. The assistive robot Care-O-Bot 4 configured with two arms and
spherical hip and head joints.
relevant not only to assistive robots but also to autonomous
vehicles, medical devices and companion robots.
To meet this aim we examine how both the safety-critical
and socially important behaviours of an assitive robot rely
on the user’s engagement with the robot. User engagement,
particularly in safety-critical situations, is partially determined
by the social credibility of the robot, or how well it follows
social norms relevant to its environment. In Section II we
present a case study assistive robot, identifying some of its
socially important behaviours. Section III looks at the functional
and physical hazards associated with such a robot, while Section
IV considers restrictions on the behaviours considered socially
appropriate, as well as introducing and defining the concept of
social credibility. In Section V we identify how a loss of social
credibility impacts both safety-critical and socially-important
types of behaviour, illustrate how such behaviours may be in
conflict with each other and discuss a solution which allows
both to be prioritised. Section VI contains a proposal for future
work to validate these concepts and solution, summarizes our
position and concludes our contribution.
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II. THE CARE-O-BOT ASSISTIVE ROBOT
The Care-O-Bot [3] is an up-to-date example of a mobile
assistant robot with the capacity for social interaction. Its most
recent iteration can be adapted to various applications in care
due to its modular design. When equipped with two 7-DoF arms
and two spherical joints at its hip and head (as shown in Figure
1), it can manipulate objects within an exceptionally large
workspace. When such a robot operates within a sensorized
domestic environment [4], it is able to support humans in their
daily activities. In conjunction with its interactive capabilities
the robot therefore is well suited to execute a wide range of
desirable tasks in elderly care [5].
In such a setting, the Care-O-Bot might be typically
expected to perform a range of functions including:
• Accepting and handling a parcel at the front door
• Reminding a user to take their medication
• Assisting a user to carry food items from the kitchen
In addition, more complex temporal behaviours [6] can also
be defined by a formal or informal care-giver. These behaviours
may include requesting the robot to alert a care-giver if the
user has remained in bed for longer than a specified time,
or alerting a user if the oven has remained on after cooking
a meal. Existing research has utilised formal verification [7]
to ensure that user-defined behaviours do not conflict with
each other, and has highlighted a need for human-intelligible
output to help users define behaviours. In addition to these
care-giving behaviours, the Care-O-Bot would typically be
expected to encourage the user to engage and interact by
offering entertainment and companionship.
III. SAFETY CRITICAL PERFORMANCE OF ASSISTIVE
ROBOTS
Some of the functions performed by an assistive robot such
as the Care-O-Bot have the potential to impact safety. The robot
presents both physical hazards (e.g., its weight can contribute
to crush injuries) as well as functional hazards. Functional
hazards are those resulting from its behaviour: the robot may
fail to perform a safety-critical function (e.g., reminding a user
to take medication) or may perform this function incorrectly
(e.g., reminding the user too frequently).
The Care-O-Bot has been designed with safety as a priority.
All personal care and assistive robots are required to comply
with safety standards [8], as well as broader UK safety
legislation [9]. The Care-O-Bot accordingly contains a number
of features to reduce or eliminate collisions with a user [10].
The robot’s base is equipped with three laser range sensors with
a safety Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) that allow for
a 360 degree obstacle recognition at ankle height. Its joints are
protected with two separate safe-torque-off (STO) switches at
base and torso. The STOs are either triggered by the laser range
sensors, one of two emergency buttons at the robot’s front and
back (Figure 1), or a wireless emergency stop. Furthermore,
the robot’s autonomous navigation software implements well
established collision avoidance mechanisms [11] by default.
Despite this, however, there is a lack of sensors at the arm
joint and thus no mitigation against crush injuries received at
this site. As a result, Care-o-bot requires constant monitoring
while participating in interactions with humans that involve the
robot’s arms.
A. System failure and resultant hazards
System failure still remains an issue for the Care-O-Bot,
as for all safety-critical systems. Should the proximity sensors
fail, the Care-O-Bot could collide with a user and cause injury.
Other potential hazards include hot surfaces from the engine,
trip hazards from the wheels, potential corrosive substances and
the presence of electrical items. Furthermore, collision hazards
are not limited only to collision with the robot itself, but include
collisions with any objects it is holding. In particular, a key
characteristic of the Care-O-Bot is the presence of arms that
can be used to carry hot liquids on a tray [6]. Should a system
failure occur, the arm may be stuck in an unpredictable position,
resulting in anything held being spilt on the floor or on a user.
It is clear, therefore, that complete or partial system failure of
the Care-O-Bot or similar assistive robot should be treated as
a serious occurrence, both in terms of the risks presented by
inherent characteristics of the robot and the risks presented by
the environmental situation at the time of failure.
B. Functional hazards
Software failure is a primary cause of functional hazards in
the Care-O-Bot, as it can result in behaviours being carried out
incorrectly or not at all. Software failure has been extensively
studied in complex systems [12], and methods for assessing
the contribution of development techniques to safety [13] are
common across multiple domains. In addition, existing research
has examined the correlation between failure rate estimates and
verification performed [14].
However, a significant complexity for assistive robots such
as the Care-O-Bot is the ability for end-users to define their own
desired robot behaviours. Because of this, it cannot be assumed
that the safety-critical behaviours of an assistive robot are
known at the time of deployment. Notwithstanding verification
such as [7], there is the potential for an inexperienced end-user
to define behaviours which impact safety, or which put the
robot in a position which can violate assumptions about the
constraints it will obey. For example, an inexperienced user
may define a behaviour which causes the robot to remind them
to take their medication at an incorrect period or frequency.
Equally, a user may define a behaviour which causes the robot
to remain in another room, thus compromising its availability
to perform those safety-critical functions which rely on direct
observation of the user.
As with all systems, there is a UK legal requirement that
the risk posed by assistive robots should be reduced As Low
As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) [9]. This requires hazards
to be identified, risks to be estimated and mitigation to be put
into place where needed to reduce the system risk to a tolerable
level. In the case of assistive robots, the robot itself is typically
taking a monitoring role and acting as partial mitigation for a
wider risk. For example, a robot programmed to remind the
user to take medication is partially mitigating against the illness
which will result from a lack of medication. Similarly, a robot
programmed to notify the user if the oven has been left on is
partially mitigating against the risk of fire.
In each of these cases the user is required to take action
to complete the mitigation (take the medication, switch off
the oven, or evacuate the home). This is an effect of the
fundamental design principles of the robot, driven by the need
to prioritise reablement[2]. Reablement is defined as the drive
to “Support people to do rather than doing to / for people”
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[15] and is an important characteristic for service and assistive
robots. Designing with reablement in mind means that the
assistive robot is not intended to carry out the tasks itself (e.g.,
administering medicine to a user), but is instead intended to
encourage the user to complete the task themselves. A side-
effect of this design principle is that an assistive robot will
typically require human engagement in order to successfully
mitigate safety risks by completing the necessary action. One
of the most important aspects of safety-critical assistive robot
performance is therefore determined by the extent to which
end-users engage with the robot.
IV. SOCIALLY APPROPRIATE BEHAVIOURS
Because assistive and service robots are used within a
domestic environment, it is important that the behaviour they
display is both empathic and socially interactive [5]. Specifically,
the behaviour a robot exhibits must be appropriate to the social
role that it is expected to fulfil [16]. The extent to which a robot
exhibits socially appropriate or socially intelligent behaviour is
characterised by a number of factors, including its ability to
establish and maintain social relationships, use natural cues,
and express and perceive emotions [17].
Much existing work has explored the viability of transfering
models of human interaction to robots, including an examination
of adequate interaction distances and orientations [16], [18],
[19]. Pursuing a complementary approach, research into the
Care-O-Bot [6] has also exploited many techniques from the
“learning by following” model [20]. Under this model the
robot learns desired behaviours from following, observing
and interacting with the human. The robot also conveys its
capabilities and intentions using social signals [21] that might
involve using whole-body or arm movements.
The social norms relevant to the robot will vary with its
environment and operational use. Some may be generalised to a
certain extent, modulo cultural differences. It is likely that there
are certain situations in which it would be inappropriate for the
robot to follow the user or capture their attention. For example,
the human may have expectations of privacy which would be
violated by the robot following them into the bathroom or
bedroom [22][23]. Similarly, the human may have the social
expectation that when they’re engaged in a particular task (e.g.,
conducting a conversation), that the robot will not interrupt.
Other social norms relevant to a domestic environment include
detecting and adapting to a user’s personal space, involving
the user in decisions about entertainment and companionship
and respecting the user’s autonomy. Social norms will vary
depending on the level of care required by the user, the degree
of autonomy they expect, their age and personal preferences
for interaction, as well as existing wider cultural and social
constraints.
A. Social credibility
In this paper we extend the notion of socially appropriate
behaviour to encompass the concept of social credibility. The
social credibility of a domestic robot is a measure of how well
it obeys the social norms relevant to its environment.
Social credibility helps determine the extent to which a
human considers the robot to be a functioning social being.
Work in [24] demonstrates a link between social intelligence and
consideration of the robot as a social being. Further experiments
have reinforced this tendency of humans to treat a socially
intelligent or emotionally empathic robot as a social being, even
to the extent of exhibiting concern over “hurting its feelings”
[25]. This is amplified in a domestic or home setting, with end-
users asked to rank the utility of cleaning robots considering
their emotional impact as well as their functionality [26].
Social credibility has both a static and dynamic element.
The static element refers to design: Has this robot been designed
to follow social norms? Are its behaviours consistent with its
appearance so that both match a potential user’s expectations
[21]? Static social credibility is also achieved via constraints
embedded within the robot’s programming (e.g., “do not follow
a human into the bathroom”).
Dynamic social credibility refers to the ongoing adaptability
of the robot’s behaviour: is it capable of adjusting its own
behaviours based on feedback and the observed environment?
Dynamic social credibility allows for evolution of the social
norms over time. For example, it may be within norms for a
domestic robot to follow a child user into a bedroom, but not
for it to similarly follow an adult user. As a child user ages,
dynamic social credibility ensures that the robot’s behaviour
reflects the changing application of the norm.
Social credibility is an evolving measure, and dependent on
the actions of the robot. Much as a system which does nothing
is “perfectly safe”, a robot which is turned off and hence never
takes an action will not lose nor gain social credibility. Social
credibility may be temporarily lost by an inappropriate action,
and gained back by subsequent actions.
As discussed in Section IV, social norms will vary with
the environment. For a domestic service or assistive robot, we
consider the following contributors (both positive and negative)
to social credibility:
• Frequency and urgency of interruptions
• Nature and intensity of interaction, engagement and
interruption
• Responsiveness of the robot to verbal and non-verbal
feedback
• Appropriate physical movement and distance main-
tained from end-user
• Trust inspired by the robot in the end-user
• Understanding communicated by the robot as to its
capabilities
It is important to note that although trust is a significant
aspect of social credibility for an assistive robot, it is not
the only factor. Much work already exists on the questions
of eliciting and maintaining trust (see [27] for an overview,
additionally [28][29]), with considerations of factors such
as reliability, predictability, physical presence and emotional
response.
However, it is possible for a robot to inspire trust and
emotionally engage a user without necessarily having a high
degree of social credibility. For example, a pet-like robot [30]
may emotionally engage a user because of its appearance and
actions, but there are typically fewer social norms applicable to
a pet. Similarly, an autonomous vehicle or an alarm system may
be trusted by its end users without any imputation of sociability
or social knowledge. By contrast, a robot which shares personal
information about its user with a third party will typically be
regarded as untrustworthy [31], but such sharing does not in
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itself mean the robot is not seen as a social being (a malicious
person may have also done the same).
Crucially, social credibility also requires that the user under-
stand the robot’s capabilities, much as they would understand
the different capabilities of a human adult or a human child.
A high degree of social credibility implies that a robot has
communicated an understanding as to its capabilities and
reduces the potential for over-trust [32]. From the perspective
of safety, over-trust is considered a negative factor as it leads
to excessive reliance on the automation even when there are
indications of system failure.
V. SOCIAL CREDIBILITY AND SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS
A large part of the duties of an assistive robot involve
reminding or prompting the end-user to take action. This
involves some form of interruption to the user’s current activity.
Two important social norms for these robots are therefore
around the frequency of interruptions and on the way these
interruptions are made. In [33], users explicitly identify that
reminders given by an assistive robot become irritating under
the following circumstances:
• When repeated often
• When repeated in a “mechanical” voice
• When repeated at inopportune times, interrupting the
user
Conversely, some behaviours and methods of interruption
are viewed positively by users and considered to mimic human
interruptions, as discussed in [19] and [34]. These include
the use of direct, random and non-random gaze directions to
signal the beginning of an interaction. Other studies [35][36]
have examined users’ preference for personal space from
robots, identifying that users perception of their personal space
diminishes for likeable robots, and similarly that robots which
encroach on this space are regarded as unlikeable, threatening
or irritating. Personal space preferences will vary with context;
for example, users are typically reluctant to accept a robot
following them into the bathroom [22].
Inappropriate interruptions therefore present a potential for
a loss of social credibility. A robot whose interruptions take
no account of social norms is more likely to be regarded
as a simple mechanical system (e.g., an alarm or reminder
application) instead of as another social entity. For example, an
assistive robot which always sounds an alarm at a certain
time to remind the user to take medication is performing
a role no more complex than an alarm clock, and hence
complying with no relevant social norms. As such, it does
not build social credibility in the same way that an assistive
robot would if its interruptions were sensitive to the users’
environment, engagement and current activities ([19]). As social
credibility is a dynamic concept (see Section IV-A), a robot
which has already built social credibility by demonstrating
such sensitivities is vulnerable to losing this credibility if its
interruptions become inappropriate.
A loss of social credibility (from any cause) can lead to
an end-user disengaging with the robot in a number of ways.
Firstly, the user may simply switch the robot off. Studies have
shown that users are reluctant to switch off robots they consider
to be intelligent [37], or perceived social beings. However, once
social credibility is lost, this “protective” aspect is lost with it.
Users are much more willing to switch off a robot considered
to be solely a robotic device, particularly when the mode of
engagement with this robot becomes arduous. In [38], drivers
concluded that they would prefer to be able to turn off a speed
warning system that was judged “irritating”, even where they
agreed that use of the technology would be helpful.
Secondly, even where the user permits the robot to remain
switched on, they may start to ignore the suggestions and
prompts made by the robot. This then leads to a dilemma for
those designing such robots: if repeated interruptions lower
social credibility, then how should the robot deal with an urgent
prompt that has been ignored?
A. Safety-critical systems
Any disengagement with an assistive robot (whether switch-
ing it off or ignoring its prompts) compromises its ability to
perform its safety-critical functions. It is clear that switching
a robot off renders it incapable of providing any alerts or
reminders. Similarly, because assistive robots mitigate risk
by prompting end-user action (see Section III), any user
disengagement means that the risk mitigation is not carried out
in full. For example, a robot reminding the user that the oven
has been left on has no effect unless the user engages with the
robot, and returns to switch the oven off.
Furthermore extrapolating from studies performed in other
domains has enabled us to identify a unique user reaction
that may result from loss of social credibility, and which
affects only safety-critical actions of the robot (as opposed
to routine actions). In more detail, safety-critical situations are
the exception, not the rule, and hence any alert or reminder
in such a situation will be perceived by the user as “not the
expected behaviour”. In the aviation domain, where autonomous
cockpit systems are not considered to be social entities, pilots
have been observed to attempt to debug the automation when
its actions deviate from those they expected. In a study of
cockpit automation [39] established the tendency in pilots to
monitor automation status via the flight control unit (FCU),
which shows commanded targets, paths and modes, rather than
via the display showing actual targets, paths and modes being
executed by the automation.
Given that this observation took place in a highly-trained
cohort of pilots, it is reasonable to say that untrained end-users
of an assistive robot may also display the same mode confusion.
This would lead to a situation in which a user is alerted to
a hazard and instead of taking mitigating action attempts to
debug or force the assistive robot to return to the “expected”
behaviour.
B. Prioritising safety-criticality
The performance of safety critical behaviours is a clear
priority from a legal and regulatory viewpoint [9][8] (for other
priorities, see V-C). Motivated by this, we have identified a
number of potential methods to address loss of safety-critical
functionality resulting from lowered social credibility. Each of
these methods trades a slight decrease in the robot’s overall
capability in return for maintaining an adequate level of social
credibility. Since social credibility is a requirement for effective
safety critical performance, this corresponds to decreasing the
robot’s capabilities in order to gain confidence that safety-
critical engagements will be performed effectively when needed.
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The first method we describe is an attempt by the robot to
alter its behaviour when the social credibility drops below a
threshold value which we will term the disengagement threshold.
The disengagement threshold is the level of social credibility at
which engagement with the robot (including its future safety-
critical behaviours) is jeopardised. When this threshold is being
approached, the robot should choose to alter the nature of its
alerts and reminders to stop social credibility loss.
Both [19] and [34] identify a number of methods whereby
a robot may interrupt an end-user, based on non-verbal
behavioural cues. The extent and urgency of the interruption
can be tailored to its nature: a safety-critical behaviour may
still merit an urgent (and socially inappropriate) interruption
even when the robot’s social credibility is at risk of dropping
below the threshold. However, for less critical interruptions the
robot may choose to utilise any of the following behaviours:
• Slow its physical movements when coming to interrupt
a user
• Decrease the volume of any audible alerts
• Display visual alerts (e.g., on the attached screen, for
the Care-O-Bot), instead of audible alerts
• Approach the user and wait for the user to initiate an
interaction
In addition to altering the nature of its alerts and interrup-
tions, the robot may also choose to alter the frequency of these
when approaching the disengagement threshold. Interruptions
are a cognitive challenge for a user, and existing work shows
that in some situations user satisfaction is maximised by
delaying an interruption at the cost of some awareness [40].
This proposal allows a robot to delay a routine behaviour
(such as interrupting the user with the offer of food or drink)
in order to retain sufficient social credibility to ensure that any
safety-critical behaviour (such as notification the oven is on)
will be engaged with by the user. Other routine behaviours a
robot may choose to suspend or delay if its social credibility is
low include: greeting the user, engaging in social interaction and
conversation, reminding the user of appointments and offering
the user entertainment.
C. Prioritising social credibility
However, safety-critical performance is not the only con-
sideration for assistive robots. It is also imperative that these
robots perform their social functionality adequately. There is
the potential for prioritisation of functionality relating to safety
(e.g., requiring the robot to follow the user through the house
in case of a fall) to result in the neglect of other socially
important behaviours such as greeting, user engagement and
user interaction. In other words, a robot performing only safety-
related behaviours may not be free to perform other roles which
are critical to its reablement functionality.
Furthermore, the performance of the safety-critical be-
haviours can itself lead to a loss of social credibility. A robot
alerting the user to a fire may out of necessity do so at an
inopportune time or in an urgent or disruptive fashion. The
nature of such (intense, potentially ill-timed) alerts means that
they will result in a certain loss of social credibility. This has
the potential to drive the social credibility of the robot below
the disengagement threshold, and therefore result in reduced
capability (both routine and safety-critical) due to lack of user
engagement.
A loss of social credibility has significant impact on
the socially important aspects of a robot’s functionality. In
more detail, the characteristics identified in Section IV-A as
associated with social credibility are also important for user
engagement. Trust, for example, means that a user is likely
to extrapolate from observed characteristics of the robot to
generalise about its wider capabilities [41]. While over-trust is
in itself a problem [28], a lack of trust in the robot means that
users are likely only to engage the robot in scenarios which
they have directly observed to be satisfactorily carried out. That
is, even where the overall social credibility has not been driven
below the disengagement threshold, the overall capability of
the robot may still be impaired. Similarly, a lack of trust in a
robot may lead to negative associations with it, and a reluctance
on the part of the user to engage [29].
It is therefore clear that a balance will need to be struck
between performing safety-critical behaviours, and performing
the social routines necessary to build user engagement (socially-
important behaviours).
D. Schedulability of behaviours
We propose the identification of an optimum scheduling
such that socially-important and safety-critical behaviours can
both be performed to an acceptable level. This will correspond
to maintaining social credibility above the disengagement
threshold by delaying behaviours based on their priority, where
priority considers both safety and social engagement.
Such a prioritisation system would correspond to trading
off (safety) risks against (social) benefit, a concept described in
[42]. Traditional scheduling algorithms could be used to ensure
that the correct behaviours are selected to run, with a level of
customisation also being provided.
This problem has been explored extensively when consider-
ing scheduling within mixed-criticality systems (see [43] for an
overview). In the case of assistive robots, the following (non-
exhaustive) criteria should be considered for schedulability:
• Estimated risk associated with not fulfilling the be-
haviour
• Estimated loss of social credibility associated with
fulfilling the behaviour
• Current social credibility as considered against the
disengagement threshold
• Functional importance of other behaviours
Such a prioritisation system could also be customised to
allow users and care-givers to adjust the balance between
safety and social behaviours. A user more comfortable and
engaged with the robot may not need the same degree of social
behaviours as a user who has not engaged with the robot before.
Similarly, a user requiring a higher level of care may want to
prioritize safety-critical behaviours.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have identified a link between safety and
social credibility, where this is defined as being a reflection
of how well a robot follows social norms. The relevant social
norms are dependent on the environment and purpose of the
robot, and we have presented some examples that would apply
22Copyright (c) IARIA, 2019.     ISBN:  978-1-61208-698-9
PESARO 2019 : The Ninth International Conference on Performance, Safety and Robustness in Complex Systems and Applications
to an assistive robot. We have also drawn on analysis of existing
systems to identify how user disengagement can affect both
social credibility and the safety-critical functions of an assistive
robot. In this process, we have shown how loss of social
credibility can lead to effective loss of these safety functions.
We have built on this in order to discuss prioritisation of
socially-important behaviours and safety-related behaviours,
particularly where these may conflict. Over-prioritisation of
safety-related behaviours can itself lead to a loss of social
credibility, and to user disengagement. Correspondingly, over-
prioritisation of routine behaviours can lead to poor performance
in the robot’s safety-related roles. We have proposed a solution
to this that builds on existing concepts of mixed-criticality
system scheduling. Such a scheduling would rely on a priori-
tisation system that takes both safety and social engagement
into account.
As part of future work, we propose to develop this
prioritisation further. We will evaluate in a user study how
exactly social credibility could be affected by violations of
social norms that are required from a safety point of view.
Furthermore, we plan to investigate how safety-relevant routines
might be neglected by the user when the robot is not perceived
as socially credible. This data will be used in studies futher
investigating the automatic scheduling of behaviours to ensure
the robot maintains high levels of social credibility while being
acceptably safe to operate. We also propose to expand this
work to discussions of other autonomous systems, providing
a generalised mechanism for assuring safety of a robot which
must also perform another (social) function.
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